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“How many of you know that you have hands?” I once asked my stu-
dents. Everyone raised a hand. The clever students raised two. I then 
repeated the question: “I mean, how many of you really  knooowwww 
that you have hands?” With just the inflection changed, hands dropped 
one-by-one. I was in shock. Yet I knew what had happened. Students 
thought of all the logically possible scenarios in which they, despite 
all appearances, might lack hands. They could be the classic brain in 
a vat, stuck in the Matrix, or subject to the wiles of Descartes’s evil 
demon.
As class discussion erupted, I vigorously attempted to convince 
the students that they really do know that they have hands. Their cru-
cial assumption quickly emerged: they held the not unreasonable 
(yet unexamined) conviction that knowledge requires absolute cer-
titude. Considering the remote yet possible skeptical scenarios, they 
inferred that their knowledge of their hands was not one hundred 
percent certain and therefore not knowledge at all.1  
This assumption, most philosophers think, is mistaken. That is, 
most philosophers are “fallibilists.”2 They hold that one can know 
something without one’s evidence being absolutely conclusive.3 On 
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this view, I can know what I ate for breakfast this morning (even 
though my memory is fallible) and who my biological mother is 
(even though I’ve never done any DNA tests and could be, as my 
sister once tried to convince me, adopted).
Many people instinctively worry that if the things they know are 
not certain, then this leaves room for skepticism and crippling doubt. 
So they double-down on certitude. Yet if one examines both classi-
cal and contemporary arguments for skepticism, one finds that they 
typically hold infallibilism—the view that knowledge requires utter 
certitude or perfect evidence or the ruling out of all alternative pos-
sibilities—as a premise.4 That is to say, infallibilism about knowledge 
not only fails to solve the skeptical problem but, ironically, creates it. 
As Bernard Lonergan recognized, “To demand the absolute and to be 
content with absolutely nothing else results in a skepticism.”5 If every 
belief is guilty until proven innocent, it will be impossible to build our 
knowledge from the foundations up in the way Descartes envisioned. 
The lesson, according to most epistemologists, is that knowledge 
does not require certitude. 
Why then does the Church repeatedly speak about certitude? Fal-
libilism sounds reasonable, but it isn’t easy to see how it squares with 
the commitments of Scripture, the councils, and the “Catechism of 
the Catholic Church.” No Catholic thinker in modern times has been 
more concerned to overthrow the false Enlightenment standards of 
knowledge, evidence, and rationality than John Henry Newman. He 
held fast to the historic truths of the faith, yet he was also clearly a 
fallibilist. At one point he declared, “We are given absolute certainty 
in nothing.”6  
Newman was canonized October 13, 2019, and some speculate 
that he may be declared a doctor of the Church. For this reason, it is 
worth considering whether this fallibilist runs afoul of the commit-
ments of Catholic tradition vis-à-vis faith and certitude. While much 
of what Newman says about the fallibility of the human mind and the 
nature of faith stands in prima facie tension with Catholic teaching, 
I will argue this tension is only apparent. What emerges, I believe, 
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is that Newman’s understanding of the certitude of faith is not only 
harmonious with the Catholic tradition but enlightening.
To see this, let me first look at the apparent problem. The Church 
teaches that faith is certain. The author of the letter to the Hebrews 
tells us, “Faith is being sure of what we hope for. It is being certain 
of what we do not see.”7 The catechism declares, “Faith is certain. It 
is more certain than all human knowledge because it is founded on 
the very word of God who cannot lie.”8 And in 1870, the First Vatican 
Council declared on the certitude of the knowledge of God (and not 
just faith, which is after all a supernatural gift): “Holy mother Church 
holds and teaches that God, the source and end of all things, can be 
known with certainty from the consideration of created things, by 
the natural power of human reason: ever since the creation of the 
world, his invisible nature has been clearly perceived in the things 
that have been made.”9
So the Church has a lot to say about certitude. Yet perhaps you 
consider the matter and decide that your faith (or even your knowl-
edge of God’s existence) is not as certain as 2 + 2 = 4. It at least 
makes sense to question whether, on our evidence, God exists or 
whether Jesus can be both God and man at the same time, while it 
does not make much sense to investigate whether 2 + 2 really equals 
4. Such considerations can even cause doubts about one’s faith if it is 
not deemed indubitable.
For this reason, it is extremely important to be careful with our 
sources. First of all, the New International Reader’s Version transla-
tion of Hebrews 11 (above) is cherry-picked. Most translations of 
Hebrews 11:1 do not speak of the “certitude” or “sureness” of faith 
but rather of our “confidence” or “assurance.”
Second, notice that in the catechism passage, faith is contrasted to 
all human knowledge. And hence it seems that the passage refers to 
the faith itself rather than an individual’s personal faith.10 A truth can be 
certain, or fixed and true, without me being certain of its truth. There 
are surely mathematical conjectures, for instance, that are necessar-
ily true even though they have yet to be proved by anyone. Similarly, 
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Aquinas and Bonaventure both distinguish between metaphysical 
necessities and one’s epistemological grasp on necessary truths. The 
catechism follows Aquinas in holding that faith is more certain than 
other things because it is grounded in divine testimony rather than frail 
human reason. Yet even as Aquinas says this, he maintains that, “cer-
titude may be considered on the part of the subject, and thus the more 
a man’s intellect lays hold of a thing, the more certain it is. In this way, 
faith is less certain.”11 There is all the difference in the world between 
certitude (or, better, necessity) on the side of the object and certitude 
on the side of the perceiving subject. The catechism appears to refer 
to the former.
Third, as regards Vatican 1, we have to be careful here too. Exeget-
ing this passage is difficult. Many simply assume that the certitude 
of which the council speaks derives from Aquinas’s five ways. While 
Aquinas never seemed far from the council fathers’ thoughts, argu-
ments are not mentioned at all either here or in the Romans 1 pas-
sage they paraphrase. Instead, St. Paul indicates that God’s existence 
is plain to people throughout the ages because they can see his power 
and divine nature in creation. Thanks be to God he makes no mention 
of airtight logical demonstrations that rule out all alternative possi-
bilities that only a few philosophers could follow anyway. Similarly, 
Newman insists that children and the uneducated can fully embrace 
both God’s existence and the faith.12 Even if absolute certitude is pos-
sible for a few via such arguments, it is not the path of the many. 
While the Catholic tradition speaks of the certitude of faith, it 
also speaks of limitations on human cognitive abilities. For one thing, 
we are material human beings, not angels. Further, sin often clouds 
our judgment. Even with the eyes of faith, St. Paul writes, “Now we 
see through a glass, darkly; but then face to face: now I know in part; 
but then shall I know even as also I am known.”13 Such anthropologi-
cal and theological considerations aside, it is simply an empirical fact 
that we are often mistaken on a wide range of matters. Precisely 
because of the difficulty of proving God’s existence, Aquinas claims 
that divine revelation was fitting.14
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Newman maintains not only that we can be mistaken but that 
there is no sure test for distinguishing true from apparent certi-
tude.15 He is not a knowledge-denying skeptic, however, because he 
rejects the view that knowledge requires absolute certitude. At the 
same time, Newman agrees with the Church that there is a certitude 
to faith. He writes: “Faith has two peculiarities; —it is most certain, 
decided, positive, immovable in its assent, and it gives this assent 
not because it sees with eye, or sees with the reason, but because it 
receives the tidings from the one who comes from God.”16 Why then 
is Newman a fallibilist? One reason has to do with the merit of faith. 
He writes:
It requires no act of faith to assent to the truth that two and 
two make four; we cannot help assenting to it; and hence 
there is no merit in assenting to it; but there is merit in be-
lieving that the Church is from God; for though there are 
abundant reasons to prove it to us, yet we can, without any 
absurdity, quarrel with the conclusion; we may complain that 
it is not clearer, we may suspend our assent, we may doubt 
about it, if we will.17
If faith is to be meritorious, as the Church maintains, there needs 
to be some freedom in it.18 The truths of the faith cannot just com-
pel our assent like 2 + 2 = 4. Newman would caution us against 
thinking of the certitude of faith as what philosophers call “epistemic 
certitude”—certitude of the highest kind, having absolutely perfect 
evidence with zero room for error. Descartes wrongly identified 
all certitude with epistemic certitude. As Benedict XVI comments, 
Descartes “models this intellectual certainty on mathematical cer-
tainty and elevates mathematics to the position of prototype of all 
rational thinking.”19
The Church talked about certainty long before Descartes. In the 
high Middle Ages, for instance, Christian thinkers recognized that 
there are degrees of certitude. In applied ethics, they noted, we 
have a great deal of knowledge; but it clearly is not an area of abso-
lute mathematical certainty. As Aristotle noted long ago, different 
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subjects lend themselves to differing degrees of precision.20 In An Es-
say in Aid of a Grammar of Assent, Newman shows that this is not some 
ad hoc claim about faith. We constantly render a kind of certain and 
unwavering assent to propositions that could turn out to be false. 
That Great Britain is an island, for instance, is a conviction most 
of us could not shake—and rightly so—even though we have never 
investigated the matter for ourselves.
The medievals often spoke of “moral certainty” (certitudo mora-
lis).21 Moral certainty is fallible but well-supported or highly prob-
able belief. You are certain in that you have solid reasons and no seri-
ous doubts about the matter at hand—even though you recognize 
that it is logically possible for you to be mistaken.22 It is simply un-
true, then, that all certitude should be identified with infallible Car-
tesian certitude. Certitude, rather, admits of degrees.
Now, surely matters of faith are more like ethics than math vis-
à-vis certitude. As Albert the Great, Aquinas’s legendary teacher, 
writes, “Faith is a complete persuasion of one side through many 
probabilities.”23 So faith is highly certain and reasonable because of 
the many reasons in its favor. By grace our eyes are opened to see the 
faith as a coherent body of belief with the ring of truth. Just as the 
good person might understand the right thing to do, not by ratioci-
nation but by a sort of instinct or kinship with the good, so too the 
intellect enlightened by faith sees it as divinely revealed even without 
complex arguments. Newman was fond of quoting St. Paul in his 
Oxford University sermons: “He that is spiritual judgeth all things.”24 
While faith has its reasons, it isn’t simple math, easily demonstrable 
to all regardless of their disposition. 
Many might think that Aquinas above all would hold that the cer-
titude of faith is epistemic certitude, given all he has to say about 
scientific demonstrations, proving God’s existence, and the like. But 
in fact, both Albert and Aquinas contrast faith with scientia (or de-
monstrative knowledge).25 As Josef Pieper explains, for Aquinas the 
certitude of faith involves a firmness of conviction—a holding fast to 
the true and the good—in the midst of imperfect evidence.26  
There is middle ground, then, between those who say that faith 
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involves a blind leap and those who think that faith involves utter 
Cartesian certitude. That middle ground consists in having very good 
(but imperfect) reasons in favor of believing Christian theological 
claims. Newman avoids fideism by holding that there are good rea-
sons or grounds for faith.27 At the same time, he also avoids rational-
ism. In fact, we can see him as avoiding at least four mistaken posi-
tions stemming from Enlightenment rationalism:28
(1) Faith is certain because of formal arguments.
(2)  Because formal arguments are underwhelming or inconclu-
sive, we must make a blind leap of faith.
(3)  Because the formal arguments are underwhelming or incon-
clusive, faith is irrational.
(4)  We must proportion our belief to the strength of the formal 
arguments.
Newman avoids (1), (2), and (3) because he thinks the arguments 
are good but do not provide Cartesian certitude.29 To think other-
wise misunderstands the role of formal argumentation in human life. 
Argu ments rarely if ever provide such certainty. He writes, “Let it be 
considered how rare and immaterial (if I may use the words) is meta-
physical proof: how difficult to embrace, even when presented to us 
by philosophers in whose clearness of mind and good sense we fully 
confide.”30 Even if arguments did provide such certainty, most people 
are unaware of the arguments. He would also add that whether one 
finds an argument underwhelming or inconclusive depends on one’s 
disposition. It is not simply an impartial, analytical judgment but a 
judgment of the whole person.31 Lastly, he avoids (4) by broaden-
ing reason to include the accumulation of reasons from experience 
rather than merely logical syllogisms.32  
If Newman denies the rationalist assumption that the certitude 
of faith requires Descartes’s unrealistic level of certitude established 
upon metaphysical demonstrations and opts instead for firm moral 
certitude, how is such certitude established? Newman thinks that 
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after investigating an issue we can have “a specific sense of intellectual 
satisfaction,” “a sense of security and of repose.”33 Perhaps his most 
novel epistemological claim is that he thinks we achieve this kind of 
certitude from imperfect evidence in everyday affairs. 
Newman thinks that various lines of evidence—each of which is 
probable but not absolutely certain or self-evident—can converge. 
Each piece of evidence, considered separately, may not overwhelm. 
Yet when taken together the mind sees the pattern clearly. Newman 
writes in Grammar:
It is plain that formal logical sequence is not in fact the meth-
od by which we are enabled to become certain of what is con-
crete [as opposed to abstract matters like pure mathematics]: 
and it is equally plain . . . what the real and necessary method 
is. It is the culmination of probabilities, independent of each 
other, arising out of the nature and circumstances of the par-
ticular case which is under review; probabilities too fine to 
avail separately, too subtle and circuitous to be convertible 
into syllogisms, too numerous and various for such conver-
sion, even were they convertible.34  
The key to certainty—what pushes us beyond a tentative acceptance 
to firm conviction—is the perception of independent reasons “con-
verging towards a common conclusion.” If, when “taken together,” 
they “converge on a . . . conclusion, this conclusion can be certain.”35
We do not behave like robots, of course, calculating exact nu-
merical probabilities between zero and one for each piece of evi-
dence before inserting them into a formal Bayesian apparatus.36 In 
fact, if you take anything we are highly certain about—say, who is 
currently president—it would be immensely difficult just to recall 
all your various lines of evidence. But they have accumulated. While 
you lack an overall number stating your exact credence in some tar-
get proposition, Newman thinks that you are built so as to have a 
kind of insight into the weight of the evidence. 
We make large-scale probabilistic judgments easily and naturally. 
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We effortlessly weave disparate lines of evidence into an overall im-
pression of the truth. Newman calls this power of ours “the illative 
sense.” He compares it to Aristotle’s phronesis in practical reasoning. 
There are ethical rules, to be sure, but in concrete situations one 
needs practical wisdom honed by previous training and experience 
to know how to apply ethical rules. Similarly, Newman holds that in 
speculative reasoning about concrete, particular matters, we need 
to hone good judgment. The illative sense is the power of the mind 
to form convictions on the basis of numerous and disparate lines 
of probabilistic evidence—an ability that can be honed in particular 
domains.37
The illative sense can sound fantastical, but, Newman avers, it is 
but “a grand word for a common thing.”38 In a letter, Newman help-
fully describes it as the “inductive sense.”  This faculty can produce 
certitude, yet it won’t be Cartesian certitude—or immunity from 
all possibility of error—but rather the certitude that we are familiar 
with every day: the certitude that Earth is spherical, that kangaroos 
live in Australia, that one day I will die. This is certitude in the sense 
that some things are just beyond rational doubt on our part because 
the reasons have mounted to the point where doubt would be un-
reasonable. 
If this is the way we normally and reliably achieve certitude, then 
why would God’s existence be an exception, Newman asks? If the 
intellect, in ordinary matters, gives the firmest assent to truth in this 
way, then faith (though it involves an enlightened intellect) is not au-
tomatically irrational in doing likewise.39 Religious belief is reason-
able, and attains a kind of certitude—not by abandoning reason but 
by utilizing informal reasoning rather than formal.40
Newman is particularly insightful here. If a news crew suddenly 
thrust a camera in any of our faces and asked why we believe in God, 
why we think there are moral truths, or how we know our mothers 
love us, we would likely stumble or, at best, give simplistic answers. 
It would sound to the skeptic as though we lack good reasons or 
evidence. Yet our inability to marshal reasons in a skeptic-satisfying 
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syllogism does not mean that we lack good reasons. As Newman 
says, “All men have a reason, but not all men can give a reason.”41
In truth, the difficulty is that our reasons are too numerous to 
mention. Each piece of evidence is part of what philosophers call 
a “cumulative case.”42 Take the religious skeptic. When asking for a 
justification of religious belief, skeptics often presume that such be-
liefs—if supported at all—must be supported by a simple deduc-
tion from a single killer piece of evidence. The attempt to give such 
a reason, of course, almost inevitably sounds lame. It sounds lame 
because the actual ground of belief is not some one thing: it is  rather 
ten thousand strands all wound together into a cord that seems (from 
the believer’s point of view) unbreakable. Again, it is not just reli-
gious belief but almost anything important and highly certain that is 
like this.
In Orthodoxy, G. K. Chesterton wrestled with this very phenom-
enon in trying to explain his conversion to Christianity:
But this involved accuracy of the thing makes it very difficult 
to do what I now have to do, to describe this accumulation of 
truth. It is very hard for a man to defend anything of which 
he is entirely convinced. It is comparatively easy when he is 
only partially convinced. He is partially convinced because he 
has found this or that proof of the thing, and he can expound 
it. But a man is not really convinced of a philosophic theo-
ry when he finds that something proves it. He is only really 
convinced when he finds that everything proves it. And the 
more converging reasons he finds pointing to this conviction, 
the more bewildered he is if asked suddenly to sum them up. 
Thus, if one asked an ordinary intelligent man, on the spur 
of the moment, “Why do you prefer civilization to savagery?” 
he would look wildly round at object after object, and would 
only be able to answer vaguely, “Why, there is that bookcase 
. . . and the coals in the coal-scuttle . . . and pianos . . . and 
policemen.” The whole case for civilization is that the case 
for it is complex. It has done so many things. But that very 
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 multiplicity of proof which ought to make reply overwhelm-
ing makes reply impossible.
There is, therefore, about all complete conviction a kind 
of huge helplessness.43
Newman recognized what Descartes and many others—leading 
Catholic philosophers among them—overlook: namely, that induc-
tive, cumulative cases can easily lead to as much or more certitude 
than deductive arguments. Newman thinks their view of human rea-
son too small. Reason is not identical to deductive inference. In fact, 
formal reasoning is derivative; it is an abstract, simplified represen-
tation of real human reasoning that can be seen as following logi-
cal rules but implicitly rather than through formal syllogisms. People 
reasoned well long before Aristotle developed a system of formal 
deductive logic.44
Not only do we lack demonstrative syllogisms for many highly 
certain things, but, even if we possessed them, resting our belief on 
a single deductive inference can be precarious. If one premise is in-
correct, then the argument crumbles and takes one’s confidence in 
the conclusion with it. The beauty of cumulative case arguments is 
that they do not rest with their whole weight on any single piece of 
evidence. 
To take a pedestrian case, if one finds out tomorrow that a single 
news source that contributed to his knowledge that Ronald Reagan 
was once president is actually a purveyor of “fake news,” should it 
lessen his belief, even a tiny bit, that Reagan was president? It would 
not, and rightly so. If it affects his confidence at all, the change would 
be too small to notice. 
More personally, as a Christian philosopher this is the way I feel 
about arguments for God’s existence. I think I can weigh them pretty 
fairly, precisely because no single argument constitutes my reason for 
theistic belief. I have thousands of reasons, from arguments, to con-
versations I’ve had, to feeling God’s presence very strongly at times, 
to observing the lives of the theists and non-theists I know, and more. 
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There isn’t a single reason; there are thousands. That’s why the belief 
is so strong.45  
Such “informal inferences,” as Newman calls them, are not illogi-
cal. These informal reasons are what ground beliefs that are highly 
certain for us in ordinary matters—not just belief in God’s existence 
but things like the fact that the world wasn’t just created five minutes 
ago. Newman thinks these beliefs can be about as certain for you as 
any human belief can be, even without achieving the Aristotelian ide-
al of logical demonstrations with necessary or self-evident premises. 
However—and here’s the part where soft rationalists perspire 
and hardcore rationalists faint—the fact that something seems cer-
tain to you is not an absolute guarantee: “What looks like certitude,” 
Newman writes, “always is exposed to the chance of turning out to 
be a mistake.”46 But the mere possibility of being wrong doesn’t mean 
you are wrong or that your knowledge is somehow uncertain or up 
in the air. It is logically possible for us to be mistaken in our belief 
that Great Britain is an island. But Newman’s point is that it would 
be erroneous to infer that we therefore don’t know this with great 
certitude. Such is the power of cumulative case reasoning. 
This way of thinking also helps us see why a particular horrendous 
evil does not make theists suddenly uncertain about God’s existence. 
If you have good reasons for God’s existence from observing nature, 
experiences of God’s presence, and some reasonable explanations 
for why God sometimes allows evil, then this will not strike you as 
overwhelming evidence against theism. The atheist will never con-
vince the theist with a single “defeater” of this sort. He would have 
to offer a positive vision of his own, showing how atheism accounts 
coherently and systematically for the totality of the theist’s experi-
ence. In other words, this broader view of evidence helps make sense 
of the rationality of our religious disagreements.47
Newman’s genius lies in offering a plausible middle way between 
fideism on the one hand and rationalism on the other. He avoids fide-
ism by maintaining that reasons or grounds are necessary for faith. 
“Faith must rest on reason,” Newman writes, “nay even in the case 
logos72
of children and of the most ignorant and dull peasant.”48 Faith is any-
thing but an irrational leap in the dark. Yet—and this I think is the 
more important lesson for most of us—he avoids rationalism by ad-
vancing a broader and more humane understanding of human reason 
(where we can have evidence without disinterested deductive argu-
ments and certitude without Cartesian apodictic certitude). 
The Enlightenment reduced the scope of reason too much, and 
Newman rightly broadens it. If scientific beliefs based on broad in-
duction or inference to the best explanation are rational, why aren’t 
theistic claims rational on the same basis? Catholic tradition holds 
that God can be known with certainty; but it does not hold that 
God can only be known with certainty by trained philosophers with 
strict demonstrations. In fact, the catechism wisely quotes New-
man (though without attribution) regarding arguments for theism. 
According to the catechism, the ways to know God’s existence are 
“proofs,” but proofs “in the sense of ‘converging and convincing argu-
ments,’ which allow us to attain certainty about the truth.”49
In a world filled with both positivist rationalism and postmodern 
irrationalism, Newman is the saint we need. 
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